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PART TWO
TRUSTEESHIP AND THE OFFICE OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
GEORGE W. KEETON*
A recent decision of the High Court has once again illustrated the
troublesome differences of function which, in spite of recent statutes, still
exist between trustees and personal representatives. In Hawkesley v. May,'
Ilavers J. said:
So far as the executor is concerned, I am bound bv the decision
of the Court of Appeal in In re Lewis2 to hold that there is no
legal duty upon him to give notice of the terms of the legacy to
the legatee. I see no reason, however, to extend this doctrine,
which has no attraction for me on the merits, to a trustee under
an express trust. The position of an executor and a trustee,
although now, for many purposes, they have been assimilated
under the Law of Property Act, 1928, is still not identical, and
there is a distinction between a will, which is a public document
in the sense that anybody can go to Somerset House and see it,
and a trust deed, which is a private document to which the
cestui que trust has no access. In the absence of any authority
to the contrary I decline to extend this doctrine to trustees under
an express trust.
In this case, trustees of a settled fund had failed to inform infant
beneficiaries on coming of age of the nature of their interests under the
trust and had failed to transfer the capital of the fund to them, as the
settlement had contemplated. They were therefore held liable for this
breach of duty.
The case therefore illustrates yet again the difficulties which frequently
arise in practice as a result of the imperfect assimilation of the two
offices-a process which has been taking place for at least two centuries
but which is still incomplete, and which has involved courts of Equity in
some curious developments.
At an early date after the Norman Conquest, the church acquired
jurisdiction over wills of personal property,3 and from the acquisition of
*M.A., LL.D., Professor of English Law; Ilead of the Department of Laws,
University College, London.
1. [1955] 3 Weekly L.R. 569.
2. [1904] 2 Ch. 656 (CA.).
3. 2 POLLOCK & MAIrLAND, HISTORY o, ENCLI1St LAIw 332-3 (2nd ed. 1923).
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this jurisdiction the office of executor developed. 4 It was his function to
realize the assets of the deceased, to pay his debts and to distribute the
remainder of the estate in accordance with the deceased's last will, as
embodied in a testament. An executor could renounce his office, but
once he had accepted it and proved the will, the executor swore that he
would duly administer it, and the courts of the judge ordinary (who was
normally the bishop of the diocese) would control him in his administra-
tion. As early as the reign of Edward I the court ordered executors to
publish advertisements for creditors, calling on them to appear and prove
their debts under penalty of going unpaid.5  Jurisdiction of the King's
courts was not finally excluded however. The executor had to have recourse
to them for writs to collect the debts due to the deceased and for actions
of trespass against those who had carried off the deceased's goods.0 About
the same time, the King's courts allowed him to be sued by those who
had the benefit of sealed covenants which did not bind the heir. With
the growth of the action of assumpsit, the executor came to represent
the deceased in a more general sense. le became, in fact, the deceased's
personal representative. Thus, for a time, the jurisdiction of the King's
courts and the ecclesiastical courts was concurrent, but in the Middle
Ages, the ecclesiastical courts, in consequence of the control which they
exercised over the personal representative, assumed a general jurisdiction over
the administration of the estate.7 This jurisdiction was exclusive of real
property, which continued to pass directly to the heir who, however, was
not liable for the debts of the deceased unless they were charged on the
realty, or unless the deceased had expressly bound the heir to pay by a
sealed writing.
Throughout the Middle Ages, there was a strong feeling against
dying intestate. This was probably due to the fact that the lord not
infrequently seized the chattels of intestates, though in Bracton's time this
was regarded as oppressive. Moreover, Magna Carta, Chapter 27, provided
that the distribution of an intestate's chattels was under the control of
the Church. In practice that meant that they were distributed first by
the ordinary, himself, and later, under the control of the ordinary, by a
relative of the deceased who made provision out of them for the widow
and children and for pious uses. Gradually, the status of the administrator
was assimilated to that of the executor.
At the time of the Reformation the power of the ecclesiastical courts
had declined, and abuses in administration were frequent and virtually
impossible to redress.8 The decay of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was acceler-
4. Id. at 335-6.
5. Id. at 343.
6. Id. at 347.
7. 1 HOLDSWOR'1, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (5th ed. 1942) and 3 HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, § 5.
8. 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 7 at 536-8.
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ated by the writs of prohibition issued in the reign of James I. Clearly
some improvement was long overdue, and Holdsworth shows that the
Statute of Distribution, 1670, grew out of an attempt by Parliament to
strengthen the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to call administrators
to account.9  Unfortunately, the Act failed in this purpose, though the
clauses which defined the persons entitled to take on intestacy became
part of the modern law. Other proposals were made to strengthen the
ecclesiastical courts, but they failed to become law, not only because of
the jealousy of the Common Law Courts, but also because the Court of
Chancery had now entered the lists and, by ignoring the ecclesiastical
courts, gradually took over jurisdiction in respect of the administration
of assets of deceased persons. In this the Chancery was successful, largely
because the court had elaborate machinery for the taking of accounts
which the Common Law courts had not.
In so far as the office of executor itself was concerned, the main
outlines were clear before the close of the Middle Ages. There might be
one or more than one. If more than one was appointed, then, on the
death of one, the office survived to the others, and, on the death of the
last surviving executor, it passed to his executor if he left a will. A person
who assumed the functions of an executor without being duly appointed
was chargeable as an executor de son tort.10  He had the liabilities, but
not the powers of an executor. The deceased's property vested in the
executor, by virtue of the will, from the death of the deceased, but he
could not sue until he bad obtained probate.
Insofar as the administration of intestates' estates was concerned, the
administrator was appointed by the ordinary and, being a mere delegate,
could not transmit his office as the executor could (on his death or
removal). A new grant of administration became necessary. Traces of
the older system that the ordinary himself administered remained in the
rule that until an administrator was appointed, the deceased's goods vested
in the ordinary himself. It was not until a statute of 1357 that the
administrator was given the powers of administration possessed by executors,
and so became, in a real sense, the personal representative of the deceased.
In the ecclesiastical courts, the executor was allowed to retain any
surplus of property remaining after debts and legacies had been paid. He
was bound to administer properly, and if he did not, lie was personally
liable; if, however, he administered properly, he was not liable to creditors
beyond extent of the assets which came into his hands, and if he were
sued, he could plead plene administravit. No legacies were payable until
all the debts bad been paid. If he traded with the assets of the deceased,
he could sue in his own name, and he could use the assets of the deceased
9. See Carter v. Crawley, Raym. Sir T. 504, 83 Eng. Rep. 263 (K.B. 1681).
10. 3 IHIOLDSWORTII, Op. cit. supra note 7 at 565-6.
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for payment of trading debts, but lie was bound to account to the estate
for all profits. The Common Law rules relating to the duties of the
executor were, on the whole, strict," but they related only to particular
transactions. It was only in the ecclesiastical courts that there was an
attempt to supervise the entire administration, e.g., by compelling the
executor to prepare and produce an inventory. Moreover, the executor,
once appointed, could only retire with the permission of the ordinary, who
could always remove him for misconduct. He could only purchase the
deceased's goods under stringent conditions, and at the close of an
administration, the personal representative was compelled to account. It
is easy to see in these rules some striking resemblances to the Chancery's
rules in relation to trustees, and when the ecclesiastical machinery of super-
vision collapsed, the need for the intervention of the Chancery was very
strong. As we have seen, this collapse was not entirely due to the weakness
of the church courts themselves. It was intensified by the interferences
of the Common Law Courts, even though the latter were unable to
remedy the abuses which developed. To a limited extent equitable inter-
vention was already taking place before the close of the Middle Ages.12
It increased during the reign of Elizabeth I and in the period prior to the
Civil War.
In the Chancery, the executor was not strictly a trustee, unless the
will made him one, but there was a manifest tendency to extend the rules
governing trustees to him. He must account for benefits received. He
could not plea any statute of limitation, and, although the Chancery
permitted him to take undisposed-of residue, he must apply it for the
benefit of the testator's kin and charitable uses. 13  The development of
this rule in the eighteenth century created some problems, discussed more
fully later, which have not yet been completely solved. At the same time,
the Chancery gave greater precision to the rules governing the rights of
executors inter se. Its extensive machinery for the taking of accounts was
available to unravel the intricacies of complicated estates, and it would not
hesitate to order legatees to refund, if they had been paid and other
creditors subsequently appeared. Moreover, where the legatee was an
infant, it could control the investment and use of the legacy, and again,
it permitted the executor, like the trustee, to apply to the court for advice
upon administration, and, if he followed it, he was free from liability.
Equity would also relieve an executor against the purely accidental loss of
assets, when the Common Law courts held him liable,' 4 and it extended
to the executor a similar degree of immunity from liability for the acts of a
co-executor, as a trustee enjoyed in respect of the acts of a co-trustee.
11. Id. at 590.
12. 5 IIoLDSWORT1I, HISTORY Or ENCLISH LAw 228-9 (5th ed. 1942).
13. Id. at 317. And see Foster v. Munt I Vern 473, 23 Eng. Rep. 598 (Ch, 1687).
14. Executors of Lady Croft v. Lyndsey 2 Freeman, 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 1014 (Ch.
1676).
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In Nicholas v. Nicholas,1,5 "the Lord Chancellor agreed . . . that this
Court had a jurisdiction to see that the executor, who was but a trustee,
performed his trust, and that was the jurisdiction this Court exercised in
such cases."
Thus, the rules governing trustees were extended, as far as circurn-
stances permitted, to executors, and the process of assimilation of the
two offices, begun by the Court of Chancery, was continued by statute.
Thus, Section 68 (17) of the Trustee Act, 1925, now provides that
". .'trustee' where the context admits, includes a personal representative."
This provision has by no means removed pre-existing differences, however,
and it will also be shown that, in some respects, the efforts of Equity to
assimilate the two offices has done something to complicate the law of
trusts. Some of the more important problems arising from this assimilation
will be considered under the following heads:
1. PRECATORY WORDS IN W LS
2. SECRET TRUSTS
3. THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION
4. TrE POSITION ON INTESTACY
5. THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION
6. TnE POSITION OF A SINCLE EXECUTOR
7. IN RE l)IPLOCK AND ITS APPLICATION
1- PRECATORY WORDS IN WILLS. The Court of Chancery continued
to be troubled by the right of the executor to take undisposed-of residue
in wills. This was a common situation, for the will spoke from the time
of making, and not from death, in respect of the property to which the
will was applicable. Equity would have preferred to make the executor
a trustee of the residue for the next-of-kin but did not feel inclined to
depart so radically from the practice both of the Common Law and of
ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Accordingly, even so early as Lord Chancellor
Jeffreys, it was decided 1 that a legacy given to an executor was to com-
pensate him for his trouble, so that in these circumstances the executor
became a trustee of the residue for the next-of-kin. A new set of problems
arose, however, where there were several executors. If a legacy was given
to them jointly, they became trustees for the next-of-kin once again. More-
over, if one of the executors, through receiving a legacy, was a trustee,
then they were all trustees, because they took jointly.Y7 If, however, the
testator gave the executors unequal legacies, they were apparently in this
case not receiving them in the character of executors, and so, paradoxically,
they could claim the residue beneficially. 18  In the nineteenth century, the
15. Prec. Ch. 547, 24 Eng. Rep. 246 (Ch. 1720),
16. Foster v. Mount 1 Vern. 473, 23 Eg. Rep. 598 (Ch. 1687),
17. White v. Evans 4 Ves. Jun. 21, 31 Eng. Rep. (Ch. 1798).
18. Griffiths v, Hamilton (1806) 12 Ves. Jun. 298, 33 Eng. Rep. (Ch. 1806).
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tide finally set against this claim of an executor, however, and a statute
of 183011 provided that thereafter an executor should hold undisposed-of
residue for the next-of-kin unless the testator had shown an intention that
the executor should take beneficially.
Before this desirable change had been achieved, however, one well.
established doctrine of Equity had been thrown into confusion as a result
of the influence of equitable practice in respect of executors. Equity, as
is well-known, looks to the intent and not the form. From this it follows
that no stock phrases were required to create a trust, even a trust of land,
so long as the intent was plainly manifested. No special difficulties existed
concerning certainty of words, so long as the property and the objects
of the trust were defined with certainty. If a testator leaves £500 to X
"in full confidence that he will use it for the benefit of Y," the opinions
of laymen and lawyers would coincide that the testator intended to make
X a trustee for Y. The position is much less clear if the testator leaves
£10,000 to X, "in full confidence that he will use as much as need be
for the benefit of Y"; and if for Y there is substituted "my relations",
the intention becomes vague indeed. Problems such as these recur in
the eighteenth century reports, and there is a tendency at first to say
that if the property and objects are certain, then this raises an inference
that the words expressing the hope or desire (the precatory words, in fact)
were intended to be imperative. This is a clear enough principle, but it
became hopelessly confused when the same Chancery judges, in other
cases, were called upon to deal with executors (whose office they were
fast assimilating to that of trustee) who claimed the undisposed-of residue
under wills. Here, the courts seized on any expressions of hope or desire
to negative the presumption that the executor was intended to take
beneficially, and to establish the fact that he took as trustee for the
next-of-kin. In these cases, the problem of certainty of objects and property
did not arise. Then, in turn, the Equity judges applied this laxer rule to
words in wills not affecting the executor. Lord Eldon did what lie could
to clear tip this muddle, but he was not completely successful.20 When
the problem of the executor was at last settled by the statute of 1830,
the way was at long last clear for a more precise rule. Hence, it is no
surprise to find that starting with Shaw v. Lawless in 1838,21 the Courts
reintroduced the older rule relating to certainty of property and objects.
2. SECREr TiusTs. The confusion between ecclesiastical and equitable
rules is here, unfortunately, of more modern growth, and is as yet very
far from being resolved. From the time of Lord Chancellor Jeffreys
onwards, courts of Equity have consistently enforced secret trusts in wills.22
19. 11 Geo. 4 and I Will. 4, c. 47.
20. These cases are discussed more fully in KEETON, LAw or TRUSTS, 83-93 (6th cd.).
21. 5 Cl. & Fin. 129, 7 Eng. Rep. 353 (11L. 1838).
22. See KEETON, op. cit. supra note 20 at 52-69.
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The secret trust could be communicated to the legatee either verbally or
in writing, either before or after the will was made, so long as the com-
munication occurred before the testator died. It was this fact of com-
munication before the testator's death which took the secret trust out
of the Wills Act, 1837, or its prcdecessors. For some considerable time,
the reported cases related only to what are called fully-secret trusts; i.e.,
where the legatee apparently took beneficially in the will itself. The
ground of equitable intervention was that it would be a fraud to allow a
legatee to retain a legacy beneficially, whcn otherwise the testator could
have altered his will. Incidentally, the doctrine goes further than cases
arising oil wills. It has been applied to an heir, who took on intestacy
following a promise to the deceased who, relying on it, refrained from
making a will.
23
Before long, however, the same rules were extended to half-secret
trusts; i.e., those in which the legatee in the will takes, as trustee, the
objects for which he holds being communicated, as in fully secret trusts,
in the testator's liftime. For some time, no difference in the principles
applicable to the two types of case is discernible, and in Moss v. Cooper,
24
Page-Wood, V. C. was of opinion that it made no difference, in half-sccret
trusts, whether communication of the objects to the trustee occurred before
or after the making of the will, so long as it occurred in the testator's
life-time. However, in In Re Keen 5 the Court of Appeal thought that
communication of objects in half-secret trusts, to bind the trustee, must
be made before, or at the latest at the time when the will was made.
The reasons for this differentiation between the two types of secret
trust will bc discussed later, but something more must first be said
about this latter, remarkable case. The testator in his will gave a sum of
money to his executors ". . . to be held upon trust and disposed of by
them among such person, persons, or charities as may be notified by me
to them or either of them during my lifetime." At the time when the
will was made, the testator told one of his executors that he wished the
money to be held for the benefit of an unnamed person, whose name was
contained in a sealed envelope which he handed to the executor, to be
opened after the testator's dath. It has already been decided that to give
a trustee a sealed envelope containing the name of the beneficiary is a
sufficient communication, and no difficulty arose on that point. Moreover,
it will be noticed that the communication was made at the actual time
when the will was nade, and therefore it should have followed that, in
any event, the communication should have been in time. The Court of
Appeal, however, involved itself in a labyrinthine mode of construction
23. Sellack v. Harris (1708) 5 Vin. Ab. 521, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 46, 22 Eng. Rep. 40
(Ch. 1708).
24. 1 J. & H. 352, 367, 70 Eng. Rep. 782, 789 (1861).
25. [19371 I Ch. 236 (C.A.).
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which has very little to commend it. They decided (1) that the word
"may" in "such person etc. as may be notified by me to them" necessarily
implied futurity. This is at least arguable. Grammatically ,"may" usually
denotes the subjunctive. Having decided this point of construction, the
Court of Appeal then decided (2) that an indication of intention to com-
municate in the future was not satisfied by a present communication; and
(3) even if there had been a future communication, it would have been
ineffective, as a testator cannot reserve to himself the right to alter his
will in the future. If this is true, it is equally an objection to fully-secret
trusts, where there is a communication after the will is made. In neither
case, however, can the argument be supported, as the whole basis of the
doctrine of secret trusts is the assumption that the trust operates outside
the will. In any case, the third proposition is obiter only.
The origin of the error into which the Court of Appeal fell in
In re Keen is once again to be found in the law of wills, and the confusion
which doctrines of the ecclesiastical court have produced in Equity. There
has long been in the law of wills the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
'rhis allows the incorporation of unattested documents into a will, by way
of supplement, subject to certain clearly-established conditions. These are:
1). There must be a document. The difficulties of incorporating
verbal communications, whether the executor or anyone else, is obvious,
though Equity faced it in secret trusts verbally communicated.
2). The document iiust be identified with reasonable certainty in the
will itself.
3). The document must be in existence before, or, at the latest, at the
time when the will is made.
So long as this doctrine was applied only by courts of probate (until
1857 the ecclesiastical courts) there was no risk of confusing it with the
equitable doctrine of secret trusts. The danger became a reality, however,
when the Court of Chancery began to construe wills, as a preliminary
to administering them. What is perhaps worse is that courts began to use
cases decided upon incorporation by reference as authorities for the equitable
doctrine of secret trusts. 'his was done, for instance, by Parker, V.C., in
Johnson v. Ball,20 where Croker v. Marquis of HertfordT is relied on, though
it is purely a case of incorporation by reference. It is, of course, possible
that Johnson v. Ball itself is a case of incorporation by reference, in which
case it is wrongly relied on in In Re Keen. If it was not, both Johnson
v. Ball and In re Keen were decided on an authority which was irrelevant. 28
26. 5 De C. & Sin. 85, 64 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1851).
27. 4 Moo. 339, 13 Eng. Rep. 334 (1844).
28. Biggs v. Penny 3 De G. & Sm. 525, 64 Eng. Rep. 590 (1849), was also
relied on in in re Keen, but this also was not in point, for the communication there
was after the testator's death.
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It should not be necessary to stress further that the two doctrines
are quite distinct. One relates to documents only; the other relates to
ay kind of communication. One doctrine applies only to wills; the
other applies to intestacy also. Finally, the document must be identified
in the will; the communication need not be referred to at all in the will.
Nevertheless, the confusion of the two doctrines has occurred and will
not be easily eliminated.
3. THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. Until the second half of the nine-
teenth century, no statute of limitation applied so as to excuse a trustee
or personal representative from liability. However, the Real Property
Limitation Act, 1874, barred the legatee's action to recover his legacy after
twelve years. The executor, as such, is not a trustee, though he has many
of the liabilities of a trustee and is often also a trustee under the will for
certain specific purposes. For a period of time no statute of limitations
applied to trustees. Accordingly, for this period, where there were claims
against executors, in which lapse of time was a factor, executors sought to
establish that they had acted in the capacity of executors, and not as
trustees. 29  In 1888, however, the Trustee Act made a six-year period of
limitation applicable to trustees. Thereafter, the tendency has been for
executors to seek to establish that their actions were done as trustees, and
not as executors. The solution of any particular problem is not easy.
It does not necessarily depend upon the actual time when the act was
done, for trusts may have been set up before the estate is fully adminis-
tcred.Y10 One thing at least is clear. It is impossible to be acting as an
executor (or administrator) and as a trustee simultaneously.
4. THE POSITION ON IN'EsrACY. A further problem of a similar kind
was created by the Administration of Estates Act, 1925. By Sections 46
and 47 of that Act, certain statutory trusts for the next of kin are declared
to arise and to be imposed on the administrator, on the death of a person
intestate. Do these sections at long last make a person at one and the
same moment an administrator and trustee? In In Re Yerburgh, ' it was
decided that the statutory trusts only arise when the administration is
complete.
5. THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION. The executor has wide powers of
appropriation of legacies, and of funds to meet annuities. In Section 41
of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, there is also a wide power of
appropriation of real or personal estate, including choses in action, accord-
ing to the respective rights of the persons interested in the property of
the deceased. This statutory power is not shared by trustees, and their
29. See e.g., In re Davis [1891] 3 Ch. 119 (C.A.)- In re Swain [1891] 3 Ch.
233; In re Timmis [1902] 1 Ch. 176; In re Mackay [190e] 1 Gh. 25.
30. See Harvell v. Foster [1954] 2 Q.B. 367 G.A. The present periods of
limitation are contained in 55.19 and 20 of the Limitation Act, 1939.
31. (1928) W.N. 208.
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powers are discussed by Lewin with some caution. He points out 2 that
Stirling, J. in In re Nickels 3 thought that trustees, acting fairly in the
administration of a trust, had a power to appropriate shares of residue,
even where there were infant beneficiaries. Even so, however, in cases
of difficulty, resort was usually had to the courts and Lewin concludes:
Where trustees are directed to invest the infants' share on any
particular securities, they might, it would seem, accept securities
of the nature prescribed at the market price, as the transaction
when resolved would be the payment of so much money, and the
investment of it by the trustees in the requisite securities. Where
there are no special powers, the trustees might be justified in
turning the whole of the irregular species of property into money
and dividing the proceeds.
It would have been simpler, and it would have assisted the process
of assimilation of the two offices, if the statutory power had been extended
to trustees.
6. THE PosrriON OF A SINGLE EXECUTOR. The old practice of the
ecclesiastical courts permitted a single executor, acting alone, to exercise
full powers of administration. Whilst the law of trusts does not formally
require two trustees in order to act at all, two trustees or a trust corporation
are required by Equity to execute certain important transactions; e.g., the
conveyance of land subject to the trust. 4 These differences are sometimes
irritating, and the value of perpetuating them may be questioned.
7. IN RE DIPLOCK AND ITS APPLICATION.3 5 The decision of the Ilouse
of Lords in In re Diplock has indicated that there may be an important
difference between the law relating to executors and that relating to
trustees upon the recovery of funds wrongly paid to strangers, instead of
beneficiaries. In both cases, it is clear that the possibility of recovery
only exists when the rights of the beneficiary against the trustee or executor
have been exhausted. In In re Diplock the House of Lords, in addition
to the remedy of tracing, applicable both to wills and trusts, permitted
a remedy in personam against the strangers wrongly paid. In so deciding
the House of Lords was careful to explain that this was a right available
to legatees only, and the examination made by the members of the House
of Lords indicate that this right was derived from older ecclesiastical
practice. It is, of course, possible that the right might at some future
date be extended to beneficiaries under trusts. If that should be done,
it would be an extension of the principle, but at the present time it must
be regarded as at least doubtful whether the unpaid beneficiary has a
32. LEwiN oN TRUSTS, 300 (15th ed. 1950).
33. [1898 1 Ch. 630.
34. E.g., Trustee Act, 1925, Sect. 14; c.f. Administration of Estates Act, 1925,
Sect. 2(1). And see Trustee Act, 1925, Sect. 15.
35. [19511 A.C, 251 sub. norn. Ministry of Health v. Simpson.
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remedy which is unquestionably enjoyed by the unpaid legatee. There
is no similar authority in favor of the beneficiary in the reports of the
period 1660-1750.
The list of differences still prevailing between trustees and executors
could be extended. As in the recent case of Hawkesley v. MayAW they
emerge upon occasion to emphasize that, however desirable it may be
from the standpoint of principle, the differing functions of personal
representative and trustee must perpetuate the more important of these
differences. Nevertheless, it is desirable to consider, from time to time,
whether a particular difference is functionally necessary, or whether it is
simply the consequence of a distinct historical origin. On the other
hand there are doctrines, of which prccatory trusts and secret trusts are
examples, in which elements of rules applicable to trustees and other rules
applicable to executors have been intermingled, to the detriment of modern
principles of Equity.
36. [19551 3 Weekly L.R. 569.
